AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1865-98)

=French Intrigues in Mexico Blocked.=--Between the war for the union and
the war with Spain, the Department of State had many an occasion to
present the rights of America among the powers of the world. Only a
little while after the civil conflict came to a close, it was called
upon to deal with a dangerous situation created in Mexico by the
ambitions of Napoleon III. During the administration of Buchanan, Mexico
had fallen into disorder through the strife of the Liberal and the
Clerical parties; the President asked for authority to use American
troops to bring to a peaceful haven "a wreck upon the ocean, drifting
about as she is impelled by different factions." Our own domestic crisis
then intervened.

Observing the United States heavily involved in its own problems, the
great powers, England, France, and Spain, decided in the autumn of 1861
to take a hand themselves in restoring order in Mexico. They entered
into an agreement to enforce the claims of their citizens against Mexico
and to protect their subjects residing in that republic. They invited
the United States to join them, and, on meeting a polite refusal, they
prepared for a combined military and naval demonstration on their own
account. In the midst of this action England and Spain, discovering the
sinister purposes of Napoleon, withdrew their troops and left the field
to him.

The French Emperor, it was well known, looked with jealousy upon the
growth of the United States and dreamed of establishing in the Western
hemisphere an imperial power to offset the American republic.
Intervention to collect debts was only a cloak for his deeper designs.
Throwing off that guise in due time, he made the Archduke Maximilian, a
brother of the ruler of Austria, emperor in Mexico, and surrounded his
throne by French soldiers, in spite of all protests.

This insolent attack upon the Mexican republic, deeply resented in the
United States, was allowed to drift in its course until 1865. At that
juncture General Sheridan was dispatched to the Mexican border with a
large armed force; General Grant urged the use of the American army to
expel the French from this continent. The Secretary of State, Seward,
counseled negotiation first, and, applying the Monroe Doctrine, was able
to prevail upon Napoleon III to withdraw his troops. Without the support
of French arms, the sham empire in Mexico collapsed like a house of
cards and the unhappy Maximilian, the victim of French ambition and
intrigue, met his death at the hands of a Mexican firing squad.

=Alaska Purchased.=--The Mexican affair had not been brought to a close
before the Department of State was busy with negotiations which resulted
in the purchase of Alaska from Russia. The treaty of cession, signed on
March 30, 1867, added to the United States a domain of nearly six
hundred thousand square miles, a territory larger than Texas and nearly
three-fourths the size of the Louisiana purchase. Though it was a
distant colony separated from our continental domain by a thousand miles
of water, no question of "imperialism" or "colonization foreign to
American doctrines" seems to have been raised at the time. The treaty
was ratified promptly by the Senate. The purchase price, $7,200,000, was
voted by the House of Representatives after the display of some
resentment against a system that compelled it to appropriate money to
fulfill an obligation which it had no part in making. Seward, who
formulated the treaty, rejoiced, as he afterwards said, that he had kept
Alaska out of the hands of England.

=American Interest in the Caribbean.=--Having achieved this diplomatic
triumph, Seward turned to the increase of American power in another
direction. He negotiated, with Denmark, a treaty providing for the
purchase of the islands of St. John and St. Thomas in the West Indies,
strategic points in the Caribbean for sea power. This project, long
afterward brought to fruition by other men, was defeated on this
occasion by the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty. Evidently it
was not yet prepared to exercise colonial dominion over other races.

Undaunted by the misadventure in Caribbean policies, President Grant
warmly advocated the acquisition of Santo Domingo. This little republic
had long been in a state of general disorder. In 1869 a treaty of
annexation was concluded with its president. The document Grant
transmitted to the Senate with his cordial approval, only to have it
rejected. Not at all changed in his opinion by the outcome of his
effort, he continued to urge the subject of annexation. Even in his last
message to Congress he referred to it, saying that time had only proved
the wisdom of his early course. The addition of Santo Domingo to the
American sphere of protection was the work of a later generation. The
State Department, temporarily checked, had to bide its time.

=The _Alabama_ Claims Arbitrated.=--Indeed, it had in hand a far more
serious matter, a vexing issue that grew out of Civil War diplomacy. The
British government, as already pointed out in other connections, had
permitted Confederate cruisers, including the famous _Alabama_, built in
British ports, to escape and prey upon the commerce of the Northern
states. This action, denounced at the time by our government as a grave
breach of neutrality as well as a grievous injury to American citizens,
led first to remonstrances and finally to repeated claims for damages
done to American ships and goods. For a long time Great Britain was
firm. Her foreign secretary denied all obligations in the premises,
adding somewhat curtly that "he wished to say once for all that Her
Majesty's government disclaimed any responsibility for the losses and
hoped that they had made their position perfectly clear." Still
President Grant was not persuaded that the door of diplomacy, though
closed, was barred. Hamilton Fish, his Secretary of State, renewed the
demand. Finally he secured from the British government in 1871 the
treaty of Washington providing for the arbitration not merely of the
_Alabama_ and other claims but also all points of serious controversy
between the two countries.

The tribunal of arbitration thus authorized sat at Geneva in
Switzerland, and after a long and careful review of the arguments on
both sides awarded to the United States the lump sum of $15,500,000 to
be distributed among the American claimants. The damages thus allowed
were large, unquestionably larger than strict justice required and it is
not surprising that the decision excited much adverse comment in
England. Nevertheless, the prompt payment by the British government
swept away at once a great cloud of ill-feeling in America. Moreover,
the spectacle of two powerful nations choosing the way of peaceful
arbitration to settle an angry dispute seemed a happy, if illusory, omen
of a modern method for avoiding the arbitrament of war.

=Samoa.=--If the Senate had its doubts at first about the wisdom of
acquiring strategic points for naval power in distant seas, the same
could not be said of the State Department or naval officers. In 1872
Commander Meade, of the United States navy, alive to the importance of
coaling stations even in mid-ocean, made a commercial agreement with the
chief of Tutuila, one of the Samoan Islands, far below the equator, in
the southern Pacific, nearer to Australia than to California. This
agreement, providing among other things for our use of the harbor of
Pago Pago as a naval base, was six years later changed into a formal
treaty ratified by the Senate.

Such enterprise could not escape the vigilant eyes of England and
Germany, both mindful of the course of the sea power in history. The
German emperor, seizing as a pretext a quarrel between his consul in the
islands and a native king, laid claim to an interest in the Samoan
group. England, aware of the dangers arising from German outposts in the
southern seas so near to Australia, was not content to stand aside. So
it happened that all three countries sent battleships to the Samoan
waters, threatening a crisis that was fortunately averted by friendly
settlement. If, as is alleged, Germany entertained a notion of
challenging American sea power then and there, the presence of British
ships must have dispelled that dream.

The result of the affair was a tripartite agreement by which the three
powers in 1889 undertook a protectorate over the islands. But joint
control proved unsatisfactory. There was constant friction between the
Germans and the English. The spheres of authority being vague and open
to dispute, the plan had to be abandoned at the end of ten years.
England withdrew altogether, leaving to Germany all the islands except
Tutuila, which was ceded outright to the United States. Thus one of the
finest harbors in the Pacific, to the intense delight of the American
navy, passed permanently under American dominion. Another triumph in
diplomacy was set down to the credit of the State Department.

=Cleveland and the Venezuela Affair.=--In the relations with South
America, as well as in those with the distant Pacific, the diplomacy of
the government at Washington was put to the test. For some time it had
been watching a dispute between England and Venezuela over the western
boundary of British Guiana and, on an appeal from Venezuela, it had
taken a lively interest in the contest. In 1895 President Cleveland saw
that Great Britain would yield none of her claims. After hearing the
arguments of Venezuela, his Secretary of State, Richard T. Olney, in a
note none too conciliatory, asked the British government whether it was
willing to arbitrate the points in controversy. This inquiry he
accompanied by a warning to the effect that the United States could not
permit any European power to contest its mastery in this hemisphere.
"The United States," said the Secretary, "is practically sovereign on
this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it
confines its interposition.... Its infinite resources, combined with its
isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically
invulnerable against any or all other powers."

The reply evoked from the British government by this strong statement
was firm and clear. The Monroe Doctrine, it said, even if not so widely
stretched by interpretation, was not binding in international law; the
dispute with Venezuela was a matter of interest merely to the parties
involved; and arbitration of the question was impossible. This response
called forth President Cleveland's startling message of 1895. He asked
Congress to create a commission authorized to ascertain by researches
the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. He added that it
would be the duty of this country "to resist by every means in its
power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the
appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of
governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation,
we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." The serious character
of this statement he thoroughly understood. He declared that he was
conscious of his responsibilities, intimating that war, much as it was
to be deplored, was not comparable to "a supine submission to wrong and
injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor."

[Illustration: GROVER CLEVELAND]

The note of defiance which ran through this message, greeted by shrill
cries of enthusiasm in many circles, was viewed in other quarters as a
portent of war. Responsible newspapers in both countries spoke of an
armed settlement of the dispute as inevitable. Congress created the
commission and appropriated money for the investigation; a body of
learned men was appointed to determine the merits of the conflicting
boundary claims. The British government, deaf to the clamor of the
bellicose section of the London press, deplored the incident,
courteously replied in the affirmative to a request for assistance in
the search for evidence, and finally agreed to the proposition that the
issue be submitted to arbitration. The outcome of this somewhat perilous
dispute contributed not a little to Cleveland's reputation as "a
sterling representative of the true American spirit." This was not
diminished when the tribunal of arbitration found that Great Britain was
on the whole right in her territorial claims against Venezuela.

=The Annexation of Hawaii.=--While engaged in the dangerous Venezuela
controversy, President Cleveland was compelled by a strange turn in
events to consider the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in the
mid-Pacific. For more than half a century American missionaries had been
active in converting the natives to the Christian faith and enterprising
American business men had been developing the fertile sugar plantations.
Both the Department of State and the Navy Department were fully
conscious of the strategic relation of the islands to the growth of sea
power and watched with anxiety any developments likely to bring them
under some other Dominion.

The country at large was indifferent, however, until 1893, when a
revolution, headed by Americans, broke out, ending in the overthrow of
the native government, the abolition of the primitive monarchy, and the
retirement of Queen Liliuokalani to private life. This crisis, a
repetition of the Texas affair in a small theater, was immediately
followed by a demand from the new Hawaiian government for annexation to
the United States. President Harrison looked with favor on the proposal,
negotiated the treaty of annexation, and laid it before the Senate for
approval. There it still rested when his term of office was brought to a
close.

Harrison's successor, Cleveland, it was well known, had doubts about the
propriety of American action in Hawaii. For the purpose of making an
inquiry into the matter, he sent a special commissioner to the islands.
On the basis of the report of his agent, Cleveland came to the
conclusion that "the revolution in the island kingdom had been
accomplished by the improper use of the armed forces of the United
States and that the wrong should be righted by a restoration of the
queen to her throne." Such being his matured conviction, though the
facts upon which he rested it were warmly controverted, he could do
nothing but withdraw the treaty from the Senate and close the incident.

To the Republicans this sharp and cavalier disposal of their plans,
carried out in a way that impugned the motives of a Republican
President, was nothing less than "a betrayal of American interests." In
their platform of 1896 they made clear their position: "Our foreign
policy should be at all times firm, vigorous, and dignified and all our
interests in the Western hemisphere carefully watched and guarded. The
Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States and no
foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them." There was no
mistaking this view of the issue. As the vote in the election gave
popular sanction to Republican policies, Congress by a joint resolution,
passed on July 6, 1898, annexed the islands to the United States and
later conferred upon them the ordinary territorial form of government.